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Concern about potential free riding in the provision of public goods has a long history. More 
recently, experimental economists have turned their attention to the conditions under which 
free riding would be expected to occur. A model of free riding is provided here which 
demonstrates that existing experimental approaches fail to explore a potentially important 
real-world dimension of free riding. In a cash-in-advance economy, free riding becomes a 
two-stage problem, while existing experiments only address the second stage. That is, one 
would expect households with high demands for public goods relative to private goods to 
generate less income than households preferring ordinary private goods, because the former 
are unable to individually increment the public good and leisure is valuable. Existing 
experiments start with a given number of “tokens” for each decision-maker, effectively only 
addressing the second stage of the free riding problem, namely, under what conditions free 
riding becomes a problem out of a given income. A recommended solution to this problem is 
to incorporate the potential to generate income prior to (or simultaneously with) the decision 
of how to allocate that income between private and public goods. 
JEL-Code: A10, C90, C92, D03, D12, D64, D81, H41, Q50. 
Keywords: decision making, choice behavior, public goods, experimental economics, 
altruism, fairness, conditional reciprocity. 
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In an excellent recent review, Levitt and List (2007) ask ―What do laboratory 
experiments measuring social preferences reveal about the real world?‖  They focus 
on a wide range of experimental games (ultimatum, dictator, trust, gift exchange, and 
public goods) that have been used to try to understand the nature of preferences in 
social settings.  Their general conclusions are that many real-world markets operate 
in ways that make pro-social behavior less likely than it seems from laboratory 
experiments, although there are situations–notably publicized dealings among friends 
and family–in which pro-social behavior might be more likely in the real world than 
in the laboratory. 
The concern here is with public goods games.  It is frequently observed that 
the extent of free riding, from a given ―token endowment,‖ varies according to the 
nature  of  the  experimental  intervention,  discussed  more  fully  below.    But  an 
additional free riding problem has not been recognized—and, importantly, not been 
incorporated into experimental design.  When incentives exist to free ride in output 
markets, those incentives also distort input market decisions.    
In the following section, a model of free riding is presented.  This model 
demonstrates that free riding would generally be expected in both input and output 
markets.  In Section III, it is seen that existing experimental methods ignore half of 
the  general  problem,  making  extrapolation  to  real-world  settings  even  more 
problematic  than  previously  thought.    Section  IV  concludes  with  research 
recommendations. 
 
II.   Rational Public Good Free-Riding Behavior: A Simple Model 
 
For models of free riding behavior to be relevant to experimental analyses, they must 
incorporate two central observations that are really a generalization of the prisoner’s 
dilemma.  First, if an individual attempts to increment the public good, and others do 
not, private good losses are large relative to any gains from the public good.  Second, 
if the other households do contribute to the public good provision, an individual 
household will be little damaged by failing to contribute.  Both of these effects work 
to encourage free riding, but the extent of free riding in the laboratory or in the real 
world will depend on many things, including the numbers of people involved and 
whether decisions are ―one-shot‖ or repeating. 
Let the price of ordinary goods, X, be the numeraire good and let (1- Li) 
represent the share of total time (normalized to equal 1) spent working at wage Wi, 
and G is the amount of public good consumed.  A simple model capturing the 
essential nature
1 of free riding for household i is as follows: 
 
                                                 
1 
Most models of free riding (e.g. those in Varian 1987 or Hanley, Shogren, and White 1997) do not 
endogenize leisure, but start with a fixed money income.  This explicitly omits the present concern 
with free riding in input markets.  
1)    Max U(Li, Xi, G) subject to the budget constraint (1- Li)Wi = Xi + pGi 
 
where G =  Gi + Gj      j  i. 
 
That  is,  the  quantity  of  the  public  good  that  each  individual  actually 
experiences equals what he and all other households collectively choose.  Assuming a 
Nash equilibrium, we take Gj as given, so the optimization of Equation 1) reflects 
the sum of all individuals’ choices.  
While the marginal benefit of an increment to the private good is U()/X, 
the marginal benefit of the public good is the sum of the benefits over all of the 
individuals, U()/G,  i.  Hence, from society’s perspective, setting the marginal 
rate of substitution between G and ordinary goods optimally to equal their price ratios 
results in (U()/G)/(U()/X) = p. 
Strictly rational optimizing individuals only equate their individual marginal 
value to the price:    (U()/G)/(U()/X) = p.  The marginal benefit level is set 
much too high
2 with total consumption of G correspondingly set much too low.  If 
there were only two non-cooperating individuals in society with similar preferences, 
G would be provided at about half of the socially -optimal level, and as the number of 
individuals gets larger, the difference between the social optimum and the observed 
provision level progressively increases.   
The critical observation as we move into the next phase of the argument is not 
merely that provision levels of the public good, G, are likely to be  very far from 
socially-optimal levels.  This may or may not be the case, depending on numbers of 
individuals  in  the  experiments,  their  familiarity  with  each  other,  and  their 
expectations regarding the number of times the game will be played.  What is 
important is that any time the public good is non-optimally supplied, each individual 
household will have high marginal values of the public good, in terms of leisure and 
private goods that they would be willing to give up to increase the public good.
3  That 
is, each individual has an incentive to under-generate income (―buying‖ too much 
leisure).  This provides another avenue of free-riding, an avenue that has not yet been 
explored in the public goods experiments in the literature (see Graves 2009, for 
further detail). 
 
                                                 
2 
For the Cobb-Douglass, and similar utility functions that lack a ―choke-price,‖ there would be some 
small amount demanded by each individual, hence there would be some initial provision.  In many 
realistic experiments with large numbers of anonymous individuals, the optimal quantity of the public 
good for each individual might be fairly close to zero. 
3 
To my knowledge, there are no public good experiments that address the income -generation free riding 
behavior of particular interest here.  The experiments start with some fixed number of tokens that can 
be allocated between the private and public good, ignoring how much individuals might wish to 
increment work effort to increase the number of tokens available to buy the public good. III.  The Public Goods Experiments 
  
In typical public goods experiments, a group of n members decide simultaneously 
how much to invest in the public good, where the payoff for the ith person is given 
as: 
 
2)   Pi = e  - gi +  β ngj  
 
where e = initial endowment in ―tokens,‖ not varying across subjects, 
          gi = tokens subject i contributes to the group public good account, 
          β = marginal payoff to each individual from the public good, 
   and ngj = the sum of the n individual contributions to the public good. 
 
As noted by Levitt and List (2007), by making 0 < β < 1 < nβ, a prisoner’s 
dilemma situation is created in which each individual has an incentive to engage in 
free riding behavior that is against their collective best interest.  As the cost of the 
public good, gi, becomes smaller and as the marginal payoff, β, becomes larger, the 
extent of free riding would be expected to fall. 
Typical findings, per Levitt and List, are that a ―players contribution to public 
good is roughly 50% of endowment in one-shot games.  Many players’ contributions 
unravel  to  approach  0%  in  latter  rounds  of  multi-period  games.‖    The  Nash 
equilibrium for this game is frequently argued to be zero, but from the preceding 
section it is clear that if marginal values are high enough, homogeneous individuals 
will contribute some small amount, resulting is small, but positive, quantities of 
public goods provided.  With heterogeneous subjects, actual contribution levels vary 
widely (see Jannsen and Ahn 2003), and a number of variants to the game have been 
concocted. 
Of particular interest for present purposes is the ubiquitous finding that for a 
given level of average contribution in a round, there is a substantial variance in the 
level  of contribution  at  the individual  level.   And this  is  despite each subject 
receiving identical initial endowments, which in the real-world would not be the case, 
as seen in Section II.  Those who desire predominantly public goods would generate 
less income than those caring primarily for ordinary private goods.   
The  equi-marginal  principle  would  suggest,  ceteris  paribus,  that  those 
exhibiting high pro-social values out of a fixed endowment would also generate more 
income by giving up leisure in real world settings.  However, as public goods 
experiments are currently conducted, this possibility is not allowed.  An alternative 
payoff for the ith person could be created as: 
 
3)   Pi = e0 + ei(t)  - gi +  β ngj  
 
where e0 is an initial token endowment independent of work effort, ei(t) is the amount 
of tokens earned in some time-using activity (where ei would correspond to a 
subject’s normal after tax wage) , and the other variables are as previously defined.  
This modified experimental approach allows a richer and potentially more realistic set of behaviors to be observed than does the restriction in existing studies to 
identical initial token income.  
  
 
IV.  Conclusions 
 
Economic experiments in public goods provision are currently conducted by giving 
all subjects the same initial endowment and observing how contributions to the 
public good of interest change under varying circumstances.  In the real-world, one 
would expect that those caring the most about public goods would generate the least 
income, so the imposition of initial endowment equality renders extrapolation of 
these experiments to an understanding of the real world problematic. 
A recommendation would be to have a two-stage procedure in which subjects 
could earn tokens in a first stage to be used to contribute to the public good in a 
second stage.  One might also design an experiment in which the decision of how 
many tokens to earn and how much to consume on the private and public good were 
simultaneously undertaken.  With one of these modifications, a very pro-social 
individual  would  be  expected  to  both  earn  more  tokens  in  the  first  stage  (or 
simultaneously) and contribute more tokens at the second stage (or simultaneously).  
A rational free-rider might generate little or no additional token income and might 
offer little of his or her non-earned endowment income for the public good. 
It would be particularly interesting to examine how various subjects’ work 
effort would change if they were told explicitly a) that working more at stage one 
would enable greater payments for the public good at stage two, versus b) that they 
could  keep  accumulated  tokens  as  income  available  for  private  goods  at  the 
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